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POLAR CLASSIFICATION OF SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES
S. SIDNEY ULMER*
It has been fashionable for some time now to apply labels
with political connotations to Supreme Court Justices. Such
labels as "right", "left", "conservative" and "liberal" are
widely used and various speculations, inferences and con-
clusions are based upon these labels. Yet virtually no atten-
tion has been given to analysis of this popular terminology.
This paper is designed to emphasize some of the patent short-
comings of fuzzily-structured concepts and to indicate how
possible improvements in categorization may be made.
The best known "labeler" of Supreme Court Justices is
Professor Herman Pritchett of the University of Chicago.
Professor Pritchett has made significant contributions to the
understanding of judicial behavior by analysis of voting pat-
terns of individual justices in non-unanimous decisions. Prit-
chett's most common technique is to arrange the justices by
name in tabular form so as to show the participation of and
agreements among particular justices in dissenting opin-
ions by terms of court. Such a table he says, "provides a kind
of X-ray insight into opinion on the Court. The total num-
ber of dissents for each justice is an index to the intensity of
his disagreement with the Court's predominant trends ...
The charting of interrelationships in the dissenting vote en-
ables us to discover the direction of dissent .... 1
The use of this method permits identificaton of blocs or
alignments of justices. These blocs are then characterized as
being to the left, right or center of the Court, or as constitut-
ing liberal and conservative groupings. On this basis the fol-
lowing blocs are identified for the 1931-35 terms: on the left
- Stone, Cardozo and Brandeis; on the right, Van Devanter,
Sutherland, Butler and McReynolds; in the center, Roberts
and Hughes. For the 1939 term, Hughes, Roberts and Mc-
Reynolds are referred to as the "right-wing group".2 In the
three terms spanning 1946-1948, Douglas, Rutledge, Murphy
and Black are classified to the left, Jackson and Frankfur-
*A.B., Furman University, M.A. and Ph.D. Duke University. Assist-
ant Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University.
1. PRITcHETT, CTVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT, 178 (1954).
2. Id. at 180.
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ter to the right, with Reed, Vinson and Burton making up
the center group. Finally for the 1949-1952 terms, the ma-
jority of five justices, Vinson, Burton, Reed, Clark and Min-
ton constitute the right, while the other four justices failed
to meet the requirements of a bloc because of a low average
inter-agreement rate.3
Professor Pritchett has made good use of a relatively ef-
fortless method of ascertaining groupings and alignments
of Supreme Court Justices in terms of inter-unit cohesion.
Beyond this the tabular compilations used by Pritchett dis-
close very little. Without additional data, further charac-
terization of groupings originally identified on the basis of
cohesion can only occur in terms of group core-values im-
posed upon the data by its manipulator. This does not neces-
sarily imply objection to such an imposition. Nevertheless,
conscious attempt should be made to give precise content to
these core values.
What is meant by such terms as "right", "left", "center",
"liberal" and "conservative"? Certainly it is not enough to
characterize a cohesive bloc of justices as "left" of the Court
simply because the bloc includes Justices Black and Douglas
who are widely regarded as libertarian activists. Pritchett
merely says that "right" and "left" are used in "order to
accord with usual political designations."'4 But clearly such
"usual political designations" have no "usually designated
definition". The use of terminology connoting political dis-
position to describe blocs identified by tabular compilation
only in terms of inter-unit cohesion, is to associate with the
method inferences not suggested by the data. Pritchett's ta-
bles constitute an index to the intensity of disagreement only
if "intensity" is intended to convey numerical degree. But
these tables constitute an index to the direction of dissent
only in the sense of direction of tendencies to adhere to var-
ious groupings on the Court. They do not constitute an in-
dex to political disposition. They neither speak to nor identify
the factors underlying the dissent. And yet knowledge of these
factors is a pre-requisite to determining social and political
dispositions and attitudes on the Court.
There would seem to be two basic factors underlying
dissenting votes in Supreme Court adjudication: (1) the
dissenting justice might object to the direction of the doc-
3. Id. at 184.
4. Id. at 179.
[Vol. 12
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trinal movement approved by the majority or (2) the dissen-
ter may be fundamentally resistant to abrupt change or break
with precedent. Pritchett's method goes to neither of these
factors. Indeed he specifically states that his tables reveal the
"anatomy of opinion in the Court, quite irrespective of the
issues over which the disagreement arose."5
The formidable challenge is to disentangle these two fac-
tors in such a way as to expose the dominant influence on the
decision. In so far as the disagreement is the result of the di-
rection of the doctrinal movement, qualitative study of the
non-unanimous opinions would seem to be the best tool of
analysis. In so far as basic resistance to break with prece-
dent is concerned, a quantitative approach promises results.
At least three indices to "change-resistance" are furnished
by a compilation of judicial voting statistics in overruling
cases.6 Attitude toward change is reflected in the vote of the
individual justice to overrule or not to overrule the precedent
established by a prior decision. In this context terms such as
"right" and "left" may be supplied with meaningful con-
tent by associating them with judicial attitudes toward sharp
breaks with the past.
The limitations of this approach are several. A justice
may dissent from overruling a past decision because of the
direction of doctrinal movement taken by the majority even
though he has no basic objection to breaks with precedent.
Or the justice may object on both grounds with the two fac-
tors so intermingled as to make disentanglement almost im-
possible. But if a justice votes against overruling the prece-
dent, the fact exists that he has voted to maintain the status
quo and has rejected the change suggested by his colleagues.
There is, therefore, a distinctive quality attaching to a dissent-
ing vote in an overruling case. This distinctiveness gives an
insight into judicial attitudes toward values of the past and
deviation from them.
The classification of a particular justice will inevitably de-
pend upon the context in terms of which the category is de-
fined. For example, one preliminary index to change-resist-
5. Id. at 180.
6. A precedent is considered overruled if (1) the majority opinion
expressly so states, (2) if one or more justices expressly so state in case
opinions or in their outside writings, (3) if cited as overruled by the
Court Reporter in the case headnotes, and (4) if cited by Shepard as
overruled. For an analysis of overruling as an aspect of lawmaking
see: Ulmer, Empirical Analysis of Selected Aspects of Lawmaking of
the United States Supreme Court, 8 J. PuB. L. 414 (1959).
19601
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TABLE A
FREQUENCY OF INSTANCES INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES VOTED AGAINST OVERRULING
IN OVERRULING CASES BY PERCENTAGE OF TIMES VOTING 1790-1958 TERMS
Dates of
Justice Service
Livingston 1806-1823
Chase _ - 1796-1811
Washington 1798-1829
Johnson (Thos.) _ 1791-1793
Duval 1811-1835
Story 1811-1845
Thompson 1823-1843
McLean 1829-1861
Baldwin 1830-1844
Wayne 1835-1867
Taney 1836-1864
Catron 1837-1865
McKinley 1837-1852
Grier 1846-1870
Curtis 1851-1857
Campbell 1853-1861
Swayne 1862-1881
Hunt _ - 1872-1882
Lurton 1909-1914
Lamar (Joseph) 1910-1916
Pitney 1912-1922
Taft - 1921-1930
Sanford 1923-1930
Cardozo 1932-1938
Byrnes 1941-1942
Woods 1880-1887
Matthews -_ 1881-1889
Blatchford _ 1882-1893
Lamar (Lucius) 1888-1893
Fuller 1888-1910
Shiras 1892-1903
Peckham _ 1895-1909
Vinson 1946-1953
Clark - 1949- ?
Minton 1949-1956
Douglas 1939- ?
Hughes 1910-1916
1930-1941
Stone 1925-1946
Black 1937- ?
Waite 1874-1888
Field 1863-1897
Sutherland _ 1922-1938
Burton 1945-1958
Strong 1870-1880
Day - 1903-1922
Rutledge 1943-1949
Miller - 1862-1890
Brandeis 1916-1939
Nelson 1845-1872
Davis 1862-1877
Gray 1881-1902
Van Devanter - 1910-1937
Bradley 1870-1892
Clifford 1858-1881
Murphy 1940-1949
NO.
Years
on
Court
17
15
31
2
24
34
20
32
14
32
28
28
15
24
6
8
19
10
5
6
10
9
7
6
1
7
8
11
5
22
11
14
7
7
6
11
21
14
36
16
13
10
19
6
28
23
27
15
21
27
22
23
9
Times
Voting
1
1
2
2
2
3
25
1
4
3
4
2
4
2
2
10
6
1
1
7
4
4
4
3
5
7
9
3
5
3
1
8
3
3
29
20
35
34
11
21
10
9
8
7
12
18
18
6
6
12
17
17
11
25
Vote Against
Vote Overruling
Against as
Over- Percentage of
ruling Times Voting
[Vol. 12
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TABLE A - Continued
Dates of
Justice Service
Clarke 1916-1922
Reed 1938-1957
White _ 1894-1921
McKenna _ 1898-1925
Holmes 1902-1932
Roberts _ 1930-1945
Daniel 1841-1860
Harlan 1877-1911
Frankfurter _ 1939- ?
Marshall - 1801-1837
Chase (Salmon) - 1864-1873
McReynolds - 1914-1941
Brewer 1889-1910
Butler 1922-1939
Jackson (Robt. H.) 1941-1954
Brown 1890-1906
Jackson (Howell)- 1893-1895
No.
Years
on
Court
6
19
27
27
30
15
19
34
36
9
27
21
17
13
16
2
Times
Voting
5
32
9
9
13
26
4
15
33
3
3
23
5
17
18
4
2
Vote Against
Vote Overruling
Against as
Over- Percentage of
ruling Times Voting
1 20
7 21.9
2 22.3
2 22.3
3 23.1
6 23.1
1 25
5 33.4
11 33.4
1 33.4
1 33.4
9 39.2
2 40
7 41.2
8 44.5
2 50
1 50
ance is represented by Table A. This table contains the names
of the 72 justices who have participated in overruling cases,
the number of cases in which each voted ("Times Voting"),
the number of instances in which the justice's vote was to
uphold the precedent ("Vote against Overruling"), and the
ratio of such votes to the number of votes cast by one jus-
tice in overruling cases. The justices are then ranked on the
basis of the percentage of dissents from overruling rang-
ing from 0 to 50. It will be noted that the smaller number
of total instances and the smaller percentage of dissents tend
to be associated with justices of an earlier day. The larger
number of total instances and the lower percentage of dissents
tend to be associated with justices of more recent times.
There are exceptions to these tendencies, however, as illus-
trated by latter day justices such as Byrnes, Minton and
Clark with a small number of total cases and no dissents, and
by earlier justices such as Miller, Harlan and Bradley with
a relatively large number of total cases and high dissent-
ing ratios. On the whole, however, the figures reflect the mod-
ern tendencies to more frequent overruling and to greater
frequency of dissent.
The significance of the percentage figures increases in di-
rect proportion to the increase in the total number of cases
in which the justice is involved. Thus, the fact that Joseph
Lamar participated in one overruling case with a dissenting
percentage of 0 is plainly less significant than the fact that
Swayne has a score of 0 after participating in ten overruling
19601
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cases. In more recent times with a justice such as Stone tak-
ing part in as many as 35 such cases, the figures take on
added significance. Thus the scaled figures furnish a pre-
liminary index to the attitude of the justices toward break
with precedent and are, in a sense, a change-resistance scale.
The scaled percentages are not reflective of absolute values;
the scale does not lend itself to literal comparison of the raw
data for one justice to the raw data of another. The score
for each justice indicates during his Court career the extent
to which his attitudinal perspective in respect to departure
from precedent deviated from that of all the majorities of
the Courts on which he sat in overruling cases. The data
for one justice is comparable to that of another only in the
sense that the range of one's deviation from his majorities
in overruling cases may be compared to the range of another's
deviation from his majorities in such cases. The fact that
Robert H. Jackson, for example, deviated from his majorities
in 44.5 percent of the overruling cases does not mean that
Jackson deviated from the majority of any particular Court
to that extent. In any one term of Court he may have de-
viated to a greater or lesser extent than his career-time score
indicates. That can be determined only by analysis of par-
ticular courts.
If 0 is used to represent the extreme "left" (i.e., no indi-
cated resistance to abrupt break with precedent) and 50 is
represented as extreme "right" (i.e., the highest indicated
resistance to abrupt break with precedent) individual jus-
tices may be classified in this context as tending over a ca-
reer-time to the left or to the right of the Courts on which
they sat. On this basis Douglas, Hughes, Stone, Sutherland
and Black appear to have had pronounced tendencies toward
the left. Jackson, Frankfurter, McReynolds, Butler and Rob-
erts on the other hand show tendencies toward the right. At
the center we identify such justices as Van Devanter, Mur-
phy and Brandeis. In the light of our previous knowledge the
results of this analysis do not appear surprising on the whole.
The justices identified as tending toward the right are often
so classified. At the left the only surprise is Sutherland who
on the basis of his dissents in the thirties with Butler, Mc-
Reynolds and Van Devanter had acquired in some quarters
the connotation of right-conservative. Pritchett classifies all
four as constituting a right-bloc on the 1931-1935 Courts.
Indeed in 1929 Chief Justice Taft in a letter to Justice But-
[Vol. 12
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ler declared that: "The most that could be hoped for is con-
tinued life of enough of the present membership to prevent
disastrous reversals of our present attitude. With Van and
Mac and Sutherland and you and Sanford, there will be five
to steady the boat. We must not give up at once."
Curtis classifies Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland
and Butler as conservatives in "the best and soundest sense",
that is, men who were not able to believe that there was any-
thing wrong with a society in which, largely by their own ef-
forts, they had been successful. 8 In terms of change-resist-
ance, however, it appears that Sutherland in particular and
Van Devanter to a lesser extent are not in the same category
as Butler and McReynolds. The two latter justices score 41.2
and 39.2 respectively, while Van Devanter and Sutherland
have scores of 17.7 and 10 indicating much stronger tenden-
cies to the "left". Coupled with the known conservatism of
all four justices, the inference from the statistics is that
the higher overall dissenting position of McReynolds and
Butler resulted more from resistance to abrupt departures
from past values, and less from objection to the direction of
proposed change, than was the case with Van Devanter and
Sutherland. It should be kept in mind that the relationship
is the range of Butler and McReynolds from their majori-
ties as compared to the range of Van Devanter and Suther-
land from their majorities.
Analysis of the eleven overruling cases in which Suther-
land took part shows that he voted to overrule the precedent
at issue in ten of the eleven; this indicates little reluctance
to break with past principles if the change was a movement
in the "proper direction". McReynolds and Sutherland were
both property conscious and consistently voted together for
the protection of property. But in the one overruling case
pertaining to civil liberties in which McReynolds, Butler,
Sutherland and Van Devanter participated we find the two
latter voting to overrule the precedent to protect the individ-
ual while Butler and McReynolds voted to uphold the prece-
dent on which the government based its position.9 In the
earlier case, Pennsyvania R. R. v. Towers, 245 U. S. 6 (1917),
McReynolds voted to follow a precedent preventing state
regulation of commercial carriers and Van Devanter voted
to overrule. Thus differences may be detected within the four-
7. Quoted in CURTIS, LIONS UNDER TH THRON, 96 (1947).
8. Id. iat 98.
9. Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 387 (193a).
1960]
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justice bloc as to subject matter which warranted such dras-
tic action as overruling a precedent. Other differences may
,be revealed respecting the extent to which property should
-be judicially protected. The differences among the scaled
cores, however, are partially accounted for by factors other
than attitudinal differences. Butler cast five of his seven votes
to uphold precedent in the two terms following the depar-
ture of Sutherland and Van Devanter from the Court. Mc-
Reynolds cast five of his nine dissenting votes in overruling
*ases in the three years following the retirement of Suther-
land and Van Devanter. This indicates that the Court moved
sharply to the left (in the defined sense of that term) in the
years immediately following the retirement of Sutherland and
Van Devanter. This movement had the effect of placing Mc-
Reynolds and Butler farther to the right in relation to their
majorities than had previously been the case.10 Analysis shows
that the four new Roosevelt appointees in the 1937-1939 terms
voted to overrule precedent eight, six, six and five times
respectively casting not a single vote in dissent in an over-
ruling case."
While the generalizations derived from long term data tend
to suppress the short term positions as well as the short term
shifts from one court to another, these relationships can be
highlighted by analysis of particular terms of court using
the same overruling case data.
This requires the development of additional preliminary
indices. While our first index is a measure of the ratio of
deviant voting behavior to total case participation, additional
indices may be designed to measure deviation through time
and the extent of deviation when it occurs.
Table B contains a representative list of justices for pur-
poses of this analysis. The third column ("Terms dissent-
ing as percent of terms voting") shows the ratio between the
number of terms in which the justice deviated from his ma-
jorities in overruling cases (Column 2) and the total num-
ber of terms in which he voted in such cases (Column 1).
The data reflect the extent of the time in which the behavior
,of the justice was disconsonant with his majorities. This in-
10. On inter-clique shifting among Supreme Court Justices see: Sny-
der, The Supreme Court as a Small Group, SOCIAL FORCES (March
1958); and the same author's article, Uncertainty and the Supreme
Court's Decisions, 65 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 241 (1959).
11. Black, Reed, Frankfurter and Douglas respectively.
[Vol. 12
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dex yields for the justices a ranking slightly different from
the ranking in our first index, (Table A, supra).
TABLE B
VOTING BEHAVIOR OF SELECTED JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT IN OVERRULING CASES
(3)
Term (4)
(2) Dissenting Average 0
(1) Term as % of Deviation
Terms Dissent- Terms Per Term
Justice Voting ing Voting Dissenting
Douglas 11 1 9.09 33.3
Hughes 10 1 10 25
Sutherland _ 9 1 11.1 100
Black 13 2 15.3 60
Stone 16 3 18.7 25
Van Devanter - 15 3 20 100
Brandeis 15 3 20 100
Roberts 12 4 33.3 33.3
McReynolds 17 6 35.2 69.2
Butler - 12 5 41.6 71.4
Murphy 9 4 44.4 55.5
Frankfurter 12 6 50 69.3
Jackson (R. H.) - 8 5 62.5 55.5
Our third preliminary index (Column 4 in Table B) pro-
duces still another ranking. These differences merely point
up the thesis of this paper, that labels must be given specific
content to avoid gross misunderstanding and/or error. Such
terms as "right" and "left" have meaning only in a specific
context; as the context is varied the ranking is varied since
the rank order is dependent upon the context variable. Thus
one interested in resistance to change might be concerned
with a number of different variables; this paper is limited to
three - (1) the relationship of deviant voting behavior to
total opportunities, (2) the relationship of time to deviant
voting behavior, and (3) the scope of deviant voting behavior
when it occurs.
Our second preliminary index (Table B, column 3) shows
that Frankfurter and Jackson were dissatisifed with the posi-
tion taken by their majorities in overruling cases 50 and
62.5% of the terms. This suggests that their objection was
more related to change by overruling than to the direction
taken by Court policy. For if direction of change were the pri-
mary concern, changes in Court personnel would most likely
affect the attitude of the disaffected justice. One might as-
sume, therefore, that Douglas and Hughes, who disaffected in
only one term of those in which they participated, were behav-
ing more in terms of a policy content variable than in terms of
a change resistance variable. For Frankfurter and Jackson on
9
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the other hand we might infer the opposite. Indeed, it is easily
established by case analysis that Frankfurter and Jackson
have shown much more deference for the rule of stare de-
cisis than Hughes and Douglas.
Our third preliminary index (Table B, column 4) reveals
the extent of the disagreement in those Court terms in which
one or more dissenting votes were cast in overruling cases.
We note that the extent of the disagreement for Douglas and
Hughes is quite moderate. In his one dissenting term Doug-
las voted with his majority to overrule precedent in two
cases, while voting to uphold precedent in one case. In the
single term when he dissented from overruling, Hughes' ra-
tio was three votes to overrule and one vote against over-
ruling. Thus we infer not only that Douglas and Hughes
rarely deviated from their majorities in overruling cases
(measured by cases or by terms) but that such deviation as
did occur was minor in scope. For such justices as Brandeis,
Sutherland, Van Devanter and Butler the story is quite differ-
ent. The figures for these justices indicate that the cleavage
on the courts on which they sat was much more pronounced.
Finally, since the three different contexts give three dif-
ferent rankings, is it possible to generalize about the dis-
positions of Supreme Court Justices in such a way as to tran-
scend the discrepancies between the preliminary indices? One
may, of course, be content to consider any one of the pre-
liminary indices adequate to justify some particular cate-
gorization of the justices. The important thing, after all, is
to indicate the content given the terms used and the context
in which the classifications are made. But, if considered de-
sirable, one may generalize in such a way as to take account
of the inferences to be drawn from all three of the indices.
Such a final index may be obtained by taking the mean of
the percentage figures in the last column of Table A, and
columns (3) and (4) of Table B. 12 The final index would
12. This method of ranking selected justices may be extended to all
justices who have sat on the Supreme Court. However, some justices
have never participated in an overruling case. Others have participated
too infrequently for their voting record to be of much use. This may be
overcome by introducing additional voting data bearing on attitude to-
ward change. For example, if a justice has not participated in an over-
ruling case he more than likely has taken part in cases in which prece-
dent has been criticized, questioned, limited or distinguished. His attitude
in such eaes may be determined and utilized for purposes of the final
index. It should be noted that in taking a mean of percentages it is
necessary to take account of the variance dn the base of each percen-
tage. They may not be simply summed. A general reference is ZsLurroH,
A BASIS COURSE IN SOCIOLOGICAL STATISTICS, 129 (1956).
[Vol. 12
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rank our selected justices as follows:
Douglas 7.0%o
Hughes 8.8%
Stone 14.3%
Sutherland 15.0
Black 15.4%
Brandeis 25.0%
Van Devanter 25.77
Murphy .30.27o
Roberts _31.5%
McReynolds -..__ _45.3%
Frankfurter ____..__45.9
Butler _47.2%
Jackson -- -51.4%
This index enables us to make generalizations concerning
the relation of any justice to the Court on which he sat. The
relationship is determined in terms of attitude toward change
which in turn supplies the content of "left", "right", "lib-
eral", and "conservative". Thus we may say that on the Courts
on which they sat Hughes and Douglas were further to the
left in the sense of change resistance than Butler and Jack-
son, while Frankfurter and McReynolds were further to the
right than Stone and Black. As for present members of the
Supreme Court, we would note that Douglas and Black have
been more liberal than Frankfurter, while Douglas has been
considerably more liberal than Black.
Thus we have, in conclusion, ranked justices in terms of
political and philosophical disposition, but we have given our
terminology specific content based on attitude toward change
as measured through overruling case statistics. This has
been done on the assumption that resistance to change is a
common sense definition of the "right" or "conservative",
while readiness to accept change defines "liberal" or "left".
Whether this final ranking coincides with some objective
reality is of minor concern for the point of this paper. The
manner in which the final designations are reached is made
clear and may be argued and corrected if erroneous. This, it
is submitted is an improvement over less systematized ap-
proaches which draw from cohesion data inferences concern-
ing political and philosophical dispositions.
19601
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